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Abstract
Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper
explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires
so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem,
in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment to the job nor
their intrinsic motivation. A steep wage-tenure profile deters uncommitted
agents from applying. An exit bonus can stimulate that –among the committed
agents– those who discovered that they are not intrinsically motivated for the
job discontinue employment with the principal. Our key findings are that of-
fering an exit bonus increases profits when the first adverse selection problem
is sufficiently severe compared to the second and that the exit bonus needs to
come as a surprise for the agents in order to function well.
Keywords: intrinsic motivation, commitment, self-selection, wage com-
pensation, exit bonus, transparency.
JEL: J31, J33, M52, M55.
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1 Introduction
Recently, an online vendor in the United States has caught attention with an unusual
hiring practice; Zappos of Henderson, Nevada has been running a scheme offering
all newly hired employees after their first four weeks a one-off payment of $4,000 if
they decide to quit. According to the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of Zappos, the
idea behind this policy is to provide newcomers with an additional incentive to leave
the company if they find out that they do not completely fit in with the corporate
culture (cf. Hsieh 2010).
Reactions to this uncommon policy have been mixed. In a Harvard Business Re-
view Blog entry titled “Why Zappos Pays New Employees to Quit – And You Should
Too”, Taylor (2008) attributes the online shoe store’s fast growth to the quality of
their customer service. He suggests that the exit bonus has been essential in se-
lecting the right employees for this task and recommends other companies to copy
Zappos’ practice: “[Offering the exit bonus is] a small practice with big implications:
Companies don’t engage emotionally with their customers – people do. If you want
to create a memorable company, you have to fill your company with memorable
people” (Taylor 2008). A Bloomberg Businessweek article is, however, more criti-
cal about Zappos’ hiring practice, wondering: “[What] if hordes of people are going
to start queueing up outside Zappos [...], what’s to keep every young hopeful with
gas money to roll in, attend part of the training, and head down the highway to the
casinos with $2,000 in his pocket? It will be interesting to see what the impact of
word-of-mouth will have on this odd HR process” (McFarland 2008).1
This paper explores under what conditions an exit bonus could be part of a profit-
maximizing personnel policy. Our theory picks up key aspects of the two articles
quoted above. We show that it can be optimal for a firm to offer an exit bonus,
1Note that the exit bonus has increased to $4,000 in the meanwhile.
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because it promotes self-selection of unmotivated workers out of employment, as
suggested by Taylor (2008). On the other hand, this practice can be dangerous be-
cause it may attract workers without intentions to remain with the firm, as pointed
out by McFarland (2008). In line with this, and consistent with Zappos’ conduct,
we show that the exit bonus needs to come as a surprise for workers in order to
function well.
In our principal-agent model, agents differ in three respects: their commitment
to the job, their outside opportunities, and their intrinsic motivation to work for
the principal. All of these aspects are private information of the agents, which gives
rise to two adverse selection problems. First, the principal would like to avoid hiring
uncommitted agents who know beforehand that they only want to work for her for
a short while. She can resolve this first problem by setting a low wage for an initial
period. This, however, necessitates offering a high wage for the remaining time in
order to satisfy the committed agents’ participation constraint, similar to the classic
model in Lazear (1979). The heterogeneity in outside options affects the severity
of the first adverse selection problem and thereby influences the wage differential
between periods.
At the time of application to the job, agents are already aware of the realizations
of the first two dimensions of heterogeneity, namely their level of commitment and
their outside opportunities. However, they only learn about their intrinsic motiva-
tion to work for the principal during the initial period. We thus follow Jovanovic
(1979) in treating a job as an experience good – the only way of finding out whether
the job is a good match, or in our case whether an agent is intrinsically motivated
to work in this particular job, is experiencing it. The agent’s motivation cannot
be readily observed by the principal. This precipitates the second adverse selec-
tion problem, because the principal prefers to retain only motivated agents. Handy
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and Katz (1998) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) show that such an adverse selection
problem could be mitigated from the outset by offering a low wage so that only
motivated agents find it worthwhile to apply for the job. This is, however, not pos-
sible in our setting, because the job is an experience good. Thus the overall wage
profile needs to be attractive enough to convince agents to apply before it is clear
to them whether they will enjoy the job. Consequently, the firm inevitably hires
some agents who discover that they are unmotivated and do not enjoy the job. The
principal could prompt these agents to quit by offering a lower wage once agents
have discovered their motivational type. Such a policy, however, conflicts with the
solution to the adverse selection problem concerning agents’ commitment, which
calls for a steep wage-tenure profile. As a result, unmotivated agents may, despite
their lack of motivation, find it in their best interest to stay at the firm if the wage
profile is sufficiently steep. A solution to this problem is offering an exit bonus after
the initial period, which persuades unmotivated agents to quit. We show that such
an exit bonus is part of a profit-maximizing personnel policy if solving the first ad-
verse selection problem necessitates a sufficiently steep wage profile and if intrinsic
motivation plays a comparatively minor role.
As pointed out by McFarland (2008), the exit bonus may attract uncommitted
agents. Our analysis validates this concern: we find that the exit bonus can only
be a viable instrument if it is kept secret ex ante. This is so because it would be
a perfect substitute for the wage-tenure profile if it were anticipated. Hence, the
principal cannot resolve both adverse selection problems anymore if agents take
into account that they will be offered an exit bonus later on. Consistent with this,
Zappos does not advertise the exit bonus. While Zappos does confirm its practice
in interviews and on its website, these sources are directed at interested outsiders
rather than potential future employees. Most importantly, there is no mention of
the exit bonus in job descriptions or on the recruitment website (see e.g. Zappos
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2013a).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The next section provides
an overview of the related literature. Section 3 describes the model. Results are
presented and discussed in Section 4, followed by a concluding section.
2 Related Literature
The recent attention Zappos has received for its practice to pay an exit bonus (cf.
Taylor 2008 and McFarland 2008) suggests it is an uncommon, perhaps surprising,
policy. We do agree with this notion and are not aware of other firms using such
an instrument. Then again, our theory predicts that it should not be advertised,
so not knowing about firms using an exit bonus may simply be due to the fact that
they try to keep such practices in the dark. Nonetheless, another closely related
phenomenon can be observed in compensation packages, most prominently in those
of executive officers: severance pay. Crucial differences between the exit bonus
offered by Zappos and severance pay packages are that the former is offered to all
recent hires to stimulate voluntary quits, while the latter are incidentally granted
upon involuntary departure of employees. A commonly used term for severance
pay in executive contracts is the Golden Parachute, whereas a Golden Handshake
labels severance pay that is awarded on a discretionary basis. Theoretical literature
on severance pay explains how it can evolve from a principal-agent setting and what
the welfare implications of its introduction are.
Lazear (1990) analyzes effects of a state-mandated severance pay on the labor
market. His theoretical prediction is that compulsory severance pay should not
matter in a frictionless world: in a competitive labor market, employers will require
workers to pay a fee upfront to offset the expected severance pay. However, this
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result may be nullified by, for example, restrictions on the borrowing and lending
opportunities of employees. Lazear’s (1990) empirical analysis of a 22-country panel
suggests that the introduction of severance pay requirements indeed leads to a lower
employment rate.
Rather than from legal coercion, severance pay may emerge voluntarily for sev-
eral reasons. Much of the theoretical literature incorporates the idea that a risk-
neutral principal offers a form of insurance against unstable income to risk-averse
agents. This insurance may be provided either by a contract with guaranteed em-
ployment (Baily 1974, Gordon 1974, Azariadis 1975, Akerlof and Miyazaki 1980) or
by a contract that warrants severance pay in case of a layoff (Grossman and Hart
1981, Hart and Holmstrom 1987, Pissarides 2001; see Parsons 2007 for a discussion
of the differences between these two types of insurance). In fact, a focus in this
research has been set on explaining why such insurance is not offered more exten-
sively (see for example Kahn 1985, or Ito 1988).2 Similar to the insurance argument,
Booth and Chatterji (1989) develop a model in which a worker who partially bears
the cost of firm-specific training requires to be compensated in case of dismissal.
It is important to note that the exit bonus we study is only paid after a voluntary
2According to Yermack (2006), severance pay to CEOs is most often granted in the form of a
Golden Handshake. He adds to the insurance argument, possibly in the form of an implicit contract:
“In cases of risk aversion or effort avoidance, CEOs would be more likely to pursue value maximizing
strategies due to the security provided by severance pay” (p. 241). In the case of Golden Parachutes,
severance pay can help to make sure that a CEO does not prevent a take-over of the firm that is in the
interest of the shareholders (cf. Lambert and Larcker 1985). On top of this, Yermack (2006) offers
three more reasons for paying a departing executive: rent extraction – a powerful manager may be
able to expropriate shareholders; ex post settling up – severance pay may be used to compensate a
successful CEO at the end of his career for being underpaid before; and damage control – severance
pay may be made in exchange for a confidentiality or non-litigation agreement by the manager. None
of these arguments seem to bear much relevance in our context.
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quit, not if the employee is fired. As such, it does not provide insurance against
unemployment. Furthermore, if it were offered for insurance reasons, it would be
advertised and made part of the contract ex ante rather than come as a surprise.
Another reason why severance pay could be observed lies in a change of outside
opportunities of the agent. Lazear (1981) considers a setup where principals incen-
tivize agents to exert effort with a steep wage-tenure profile. A situation may arise
where agents are paid above their marginal product towards the end of their careers.
When an agent receives an unanticipated outside offer, the principal may choose to
offer a one-off payment for efficient separation in lieu of the above-productivity
wage. Note that this payment is made after a voluntary quit, a situation quite simi-
lar to that considered in our model. There are two crucial differences though. First,
the exit bonus in our model needs to come as a surprise, whereas in Lazear (1981)’s
model it pays off for the principal to announce that severance pay may be offered
after a shock to the agents’ outside options. This is so because the anticipation of a
possible severance payment would make it easier to convince the agent to accept the
job. Second, the severance pay in Lazear (1981) would only occur for agents who are
in the later stages of their careers, whereas the exit bonus that we study is offered
to new hires.
Other papers have studied a scenario where a change of market conditions makes
an employer want to reduce the number of employees. Sometimes, simply firing em-
ployees is not possible or prohibitively costly, for example in the public sector, in
markets with strong labor rights, or where (potential) customers may be strongly op-
posed to large layoffs. Levy and McLean (1996), Jeon and Laffont (1999), and Rama
(1999) deal with the question of how to reduce the work force in such a situation
and all include a form of severance pay in their analyses.
The paper that comes closest to our approach is that of Inderst and Mueller
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(2010), who consider the effect of Golden Parachutes on information revelation by
CEOs. As mentioned above, such agreements are usually only put into effect upon
involuntary departure. Inderst and Mueller (2010), however, argue that the replace-
ment of a CEO must be incentive compatible for him, because he is often the only
person that could disclose information to the board that would lead to his termina-
tion. As such, severance pay may be used as a tool to make CEOs reveal when they
are a bad match to the firm, in which case they would be fired. The central finding of
their theoretical paper is that steep incentive pay may be a less costly instrument to
this end than severance pay. Our approach differs from Inderst and Mueller’s (2010)
in four ways: First, we assume that the principal cannot make use of a performance
measure, thus there is no way to implement an incentive pay scheme. Instead, the
agent’s utility is linked to the principal’s profits through intrinsic motivation to exert
effort.3 Second, our model incorporates an additional adverse selection problem at
the moment of hiring. We argue that uncommmitted agents must be deterred from
applying, a problem that is less of an issue when hiring a CEO, as more information
about her is available to the principal. Third, Inderst and Mueller (2010) impose a
limited liability constraint, which is not necessary in our setup. Fourth, we find that
the exit bonus needs to be a secret at the time of hiring.
Finally, our work relates to an emerging literature arguing that full transparency
of personnel policies can be suboptimal. Jehiel (2011) shows that it can pay off for a
firm to leave workers in the dark concerning what performance measures they will
be evaluated on, how their coworkers’ incentive schemes are set up, and what exactly
the production function of the firm is. He finds that non-transparency becomes ad-
visable as soon as the dimensionality of moral hazard problems is larger than that of
one agent’s action space. The idea behind this is that it may be cheaper for the prin-
3As we shall argue in the next section, this fits well with the case of Zappos.
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cipal to resolve several moral hazard problems with one single incentive constraint.
In simple words, if a worker knows his performance will be assessed, but does not
know how, he might exert more effort (see also Lazear 2006 and Ederer et al. 2013
for related arguments). Likewise, Von Thadden and Zhao (2012) find that it can be
a good idea to offer incomplete contracts concerning the agent’s action space, argu-
ing: “if [...] the employee is unaware of some shirking behavior, then it may not be
optimal [...] to regulate this kind of activity in the contract, since this makes [him]
aware of the activity and necessitates the provision of costly incentives” (p. 1152).
3 The Model
Our model features two periods: Period 1 consists of one term, whereas Period 2
consists of n terms. At the beginning of Period 1, the principal can hire particular
agents if she offers a wage profile that satisfies their participation constraint and
deter other types of agents from applying with a wage profile that violates their
constraint. Agents differ along three dimensions (commitment, motivation, and
outside option), none of which is readily observable to the principal. The principal’s
payoff increases in an agent’s effort and decreases in his compensation. Agent i’s
utility in term t when employed by the principal is given by
Uit = wt + fi (eit) ;
where wt denotes the wage, and fi (eit) captures the impact on utility of effort eit
that the agent exerts when working for the principal. We avail ourselves of the
following functional form
fi (eit) = ieit   1
2
e2it;
which allows for agents to experience a certain joy of work, as long as their moti-
vation parameter i is positive. A key assumption in our paper is that agents only
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learn the value of their motivation parameter by working for the principal for one
term. Ex ante, the agent only knows he can be the motivated type, with  =  > 0,
or the unmotivated one, with  = 0; these two cases can occur with probabilities
0 < q < 1 and 1   q, respectively. Motivated agents’ incentives are thus partially
aligned with those of the principal, because they enjoy exerting effort to some ex-
tent, as in e.g. Benabou and Tirole (2003), Besley and Ghatak (2005), and Delfgaauw
and Dur (2007). The principal in our model has no means of monitoring effort.4
Hence, an agent’s pay or retainment cannot be conditioned on his effort. The prin-
cipal can commit to a wage-tenure profile and, if she wishes, to offering an exit
bonus.
When not working for the principal, agents derive per-term utility Vi, posing
another source of heterogeneity. We allow the outside option utility of agents to
be V or V , with V > V . The principal has the opportunity to augment the outside
option of her agents in Period 2 by offering an exit bonus b. We rule out indentured
servitude; that is, we assume that b  0. Furthermore, we assume that the exit bonus
comes as a surprise to agents if the principal decides not to advertise it. Finally,
agents differ in their commitment to the principal: uncommitted agents know for
sure they are looking for employment with the principal for Period 1 only, whereas
committed agents are potentially interested to work for both periods. We assume
that the principal wants to avoid hiring uncommitted agents, for example because
of training and other turnover costs.
The sequence of events is as follows:
1. Nature draws types.
4As a matter of fact, Zappos explicitly condemns performance measures; the reasoning behind
this is that employees are supposed to deliver better work, e.g. a friendlier customer service, when
they are not monitored and can act freely (Hsieh 2010).
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2. The principal designs a compensation plan consisting of a first period wage,
a second period wage, and possibly an exit bonus, and decides whether to
advertise the exit bonus or not.
3. Agents decide whether to apply for a job with the principal.
4. Agents are hired and make an effort choice for the first period, during which
they learn about their intrinsic motivation to work for the principal. The first
period wage is paid out.
5. The principal decides whether to offer an exit bonus or not.
6. Agents decide whether to quit or continue working for the principal. Those
who quit enjoy their second period outside option utility and, if it was offered
in Stage 5, the exit bonus.
7. Agents who continue make an effort choice for the second period and receive
the second period wage.
4 Analysis
We solve the model by backward induction.
4.1 Period 2
At the start of Period 2, each employed agent needs to decide on whether to con-
tinue employment with the principal or to quit, which may depend on his realization
of motivational type. The agent has learned his type in Period 1, so in case he stays
at the firm, makes his effort choice according to whether or not he is motivated.
The unmotivated agent derives utility
Ui2 = n

w2 + 0  1
2
e2i2

;
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so he has no reason to put in effort:
ei2 = 0: (1)
The motivated agent on the other hand maximizes
Ui2 = n

w2 + ei2   1
2
e2i2

;
which yields the following optimal effort level:
ei2 =


: (2)
Agents decide on whether to continue employment with the principal based on the
realization of their motivation parameter and the wage the principal offers, com-
pared to their outside opportunities. In the absence of an exit bonus, which will be
introduced in subsection 4.3, a motivated agent stays iff
n

w2 +
2
2

 nVi:
An unmotivated agent, who earns no motivational rents, continues iff
nw2  nVi:
Hence, the principal should offer w2 < Vi in order to induce all unmotivated agents
with at most outside option utility Vi to quit. As we shall see in Subsection 4.3, this
solution to the adverse selection problem regarding agents’ motivation sometimes
conflicts with solving the adverse selection problem regarding agents’ commitment
to the job.
4.2 Period 1
At the start of Period 1, agents need to decide whether they find it worthwhile to
apply for the job offered by the principal. This decision is based on the expected
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utility in Period 2, the effort choice in Period 1, and the wage profile offered by the
principal.
When the agent starts working for the principal, he does not know what moti-
vational type he is. Since effort is not monitored, effort in Period 1 has no effect on
the agent’s expected utility in Period 2, other than through learning his motivational
type (which happens for any ei1 > 0). Hence, an agent will choose a level of effort
that maximizes his expected utility in Period 1, which is described by:
EUi1 = w1 + q

ei1   1
2
e2i1

+ (1  q)

0  1
2
e2i1

= w1 + qei1   1
2
e2i1: (3)
Utility maximization yields
ei1 = q


: (4)
Comparing this result to the effort choices in Period 2, where agents are aware of
their type, it can be seen that the effort choice of the uncertain agent lies in between
that of an unmotivated agent, ei2 = 0, and that of a motivated agent, ei2 =


. The
higher the probability of being a motivated agent, q, the more effort will be provided
to reap the benefits of that possibility.
Applying at the firm is beneficial to an agent if his expected utility from having
the job exceeds his opportunity costs. The agent is aware of his outside option Vi
and knows when he is uncommitted, i.e. he wants to work in Period 1 only. Us-
ing Equations (3) and (4), it follows that uncommited agents can be deterred from
applying iff
EU1  Vi () w1 + q
22
2
 Vi:
Hence, the wage in the first period should be sufficiently low, as in Lazear (1979).
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Committed agents decide to apply iff
EU1 + EUi2  (1 + n)Vi
() w1 + q
22
2
+ n

q

w2 +
2
2

+ (1  q)max fVi; w2g

 (1 + n)Vi; (5)
where we have substituted the optimal effort levels described in Equations (1), (2),
and (4). Note that Condition (5) implies that, quite naturally, we focus on a case in
which the contract is designed such that agents who find out that they are motivated
expect to continue employment with the principal.5 The unmotivated agents on the
other hand may choose to quit, but only if their outside option is higher than the
wage paid by the principal in Period 2.
4.3 Contract Design
In this subsection we focus on the most interesting case where the principal wants to
deter all – that is, irrespective of their outside options – uncommitted agents from
applying and wants to attract all committed agents. We deal with other possible
cases in Subsection 4.4.
The adverse selection problem regarding agents’ commitment is resolved when
the participation constraint of the uncommitted agents with low outside options is
violated (the participation constraint of the uncommitted agents with high outside
5This is consistent with the principal’s aim to deter uncommitted agents, because she wants
(some) agents to continue employment into Period 2. Note that, if Condition (5) is satisfied, mo-
tivated agents prefer to continue: when the second period wage is designed to make an agent apply
for the job before he knows whether he is motivated, he will be happy to continue once he learns
that he will earn motivational rents.
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options is then violated too). Hence, the principal sets:6
w1 = V   q
22
2
: (6)
That is, she must make sure the wage in Period 1 does not exceed the lower one
of the outside options, V , net of the expected motivational rent in the first period
q22
2
. Similarly, the participation constraint for all committed agents will be satisfied
when it is satisfied for the committed agents with a high outside option:
w1 +
q22
2
+ n

q

w2 +
2
2

+ (1  q)maxV ;w2	  (1 + n)V : (7)
We need to distinguish two cases. We will later derive the conditions under
which each case becomes relevant. In the first case, when Equations (6) and (7)
imply w2 < V , all unmotivated agents quit after Period 1 and the second period
wage is set at:
w2 = V   
2
2
+
V   V
nq
: (8)
That is, the second period wage, which is paid nq times in expected terms, needs
to compensate for the outside option V , but can extract the motivational rents 
2
2
,
while compensating for the relatively low wage in the first period.
In the second, more interesting, case, where Equations (6) and (7) necessitate
w2 > V , all agents expect to stay, even those who have discovered in Period 1 that
they are unmotivated.7 The second period wage needed to attract all committed
agents reads:
w2 = V   q
2
2
+
V   V
n
; (9)
6To be sure, the principal could of course also set a lower wage in the first period, and adapt the
second period wage to compensate for this. This does not affect our key results qualitatively.
7We treat the third case, where V < w2 < V , in the next subsection.
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which, together with the condition w2 > V , implies that for this case to occur, it
must hold that
V   V > nq 
2
2
: (10)
Very similar to Equation (8), the second period wage in this more interesting case,
as described by Equation (9), compensates for the outside option, extracts motiva-
tional rents, and compensates for the low wage in Period 1. The only difference is
that it accounts for the fact that now all, even the unmotivated, agents expect to
receive it. Rather than extracting full motivational rents as in the case where only
motivated agents expect to continue, it extracts the expected motivational rents.
Likewise, the compensation for the low first period wage does not need to be as
high, because the expected duration of employment is longer. In this second case,
even the unmotivated agents prefer to remain employed by the principal, the second
adverse selection problem. It occurs because the second period payoff exceeds the
outside option, even in the absence of motivational rents. Recall that the principal
cannot solve this problem by reducing the second period wage in exchange for an
increase in the first period wage, as this would contravene the solution to the first
adverse selection problem described by Equation (6).
The principal can overcome the adverse selection problem by offering a one-off
payment to all employees that quit at the start of Period 2, the exit bonus b. In order
for it to induce unmotivated agents to leave, it needs to violate their continuation
constraint. She can offer a relatively low exit bonus such that only the unmotivated
agents with high outside opportunities quit, or a higher one that also induces those
with low outside opportunities to leave. We will first analyze the implications of a
relatively low exit bonus. Unmotivated agents with high outside opportunities will
quit if the exit bonus is set such that:
nw2  nV + b () b  n
 
w2   V

: (11)
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When this condition is set binding, some unmotivated agents will self-select and
quit, while all motivated agents will continue because of the motivational rents they
earn. Substituting Equation (9) into Equation (11) gives after some rewriting:
b = V   V   nq 
2
2
: (12)
Note that Equation (12) implies a strictly positive exit bonus whenever the second
adverse selection problem occurs, namely when Condition (10) holds. The outside
option dispersion V   V is a representation of the severity of the first adverse se-
lection problem. If it is large, it is relatively hard to attract all committed agents
while deterring all uncommitted agents, thus requiring a steeper wage profile. This
is so because w1 increases in V , whereas w2 decreases in it, while increasing in V
(see Equations (6) and (9)). Only if this outside option dispersion is larger than the
expected motivational rents earned in Period 2, an exit bonus is useful. This case be-
comes less likely when the probability of being the motivated type q or the duration
of the second period n increases. The intuition is that higher expected motivational
rents enable the principal to offer a lower second period wage, thus discouraging the
unmotivated agents to stay. Note that the principal would prefer to pay a negative
exit bonus when Condition (10) is violated, that is unexpectedly charge agents who
want to quit. We rule this out, however, by not allowing the principal to deprive
agents of their freedom to leave, i.e. b  0.
The principal may also choose to offer a higher exit bonus such that all unmoti-
vated agents quit. This can be achieved by satisfying the following condition:
b  n (w2   V ) : (13)
Once again setting this condition binding and substituting Equation (9) yields the
following expression:
b = (1 + n)
 
V   V   nq 2
2
: (14)
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Quite naturally, this exit bonus deterring all unmotivated agents from staying ex-
ceeds the one in Equation (12) by exactly n times the dispersion in outside oppor-
tunities. This is problematic, however, because such a high exit bonus may also
induce some motivated agents to quit. Indeed, motivated agents with high outside
opportunities quit if
b  n

w2 +
2
2
  V

: (15)
Using Equations (9) and (14), one can see that this condition is met whenever V  
V  2
2
. It follows that, keeping in mind Condition (10), the high exit bonus to
deter all unmotivated agents from staying can only be implemented without losing
any motivated agents when nq < 1.8
In summary, we have derived an expression for the first period wage that solves
the adverse selection problem regarding agents’ commitment to the job. In order to
satisfy the participation constraint of the committed agents, a certain second period
wage needs to be offered. Depending on parameters, this wage profile may lead to
an adverse selection problem concerning agents’ motivation. We have shown that
an exit bonus can alleviate the second adverse selection problem.
As long as no motivated agents are encouraged to quit by an exit bonus, it is
clearly optimal to offer it. This is so because the unmotivated agents’ optimal ef-
fort choice is ei2 = 0, yielding no production. Under this assumption it follows
immediately from Equation (11) that it is more profitable for the principal to induce
some unmotivated agents to quit by offering the exit bonus, amounting to costs of
8If nq > 1, designing a contract with a high exit bonus is not profit-maximizing in our frame-
work for the following reason. Our analysis rests on the assumption that the principal is in need of
motivated agents for Period 2. If she were not interested in keeping the motivated agents with high
outside opportunities, she could have deterred all agents with high outside opportunities from the
very beginning by offering a lower second period wage (see Subsection 4.4).
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n(w2 V ), rather than keeping them and paying out the second period wage n times,
amounting to nw2. The same holds for the exit bonus described by Condition (13),
provided that Condition (15) is violated so that motivated agents do not quit.
Generally speaking, the exit bonus could serve as a form of insurance for the
agents against the possibility to turn out unmotivated. Since this benefits the agents,
announcing the exit bonus should enable the principal to save on the wages that
need to be offered.9 However, if the exit bonus were announced, the uncommitted
agents could only be deterred from applying if the first period wage is even lower,
namely taking into account that they will always take advantage of the exit bonus
after working for the first period. Naturally, this requires that the principal set an
even higher second period wage such that committed agents find it worthwhile to
apply despite the low first period wage. Such a high second period wage would in
turn necessitate an increase in the exit bonus in order to induce unmotivated agents
to quit, requiring yet another decrease in the first period wage and so forth. Since
the exit bonus and the first period wage are perfect substitutes for the uncommitted
agents, it follows that the principal cannot solve both adverse selection problems
once that agents anticipate an exit bonus. A formal exposition of this argument is
contained in the Appendix. The important conclusion is that the exit bonus needs
to come as a surprise, and hence should not be advertised, in order to function well.
4.4 Other cases
The previous section has been confined to the most interesting case where the prin-
cipal wants to hire all committed agents and none of the uncommitted agents at the
9Note that both the principal and the agents are risk-neutral towards income, so insurance could
not lead to a Pareto improvement. Nonetheless, by offering the exit bonus the principal incurs
expenses that are beneficial to the agents, so she should be able to extract these benefits by offering
lower wages.
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start of the first period, and where either all or none of the unmotivated agents ex-
pect to quit at the beginning of the second period. Here we briefly deal with the
other possible cases.
First, we have so far disregarded the case where V  w2  V . It implies that
agents who find out that they are unmotivated will quit when they have high outside
opportunities, but expect to stay when their outside option is low. Maintaining the
assumption that the principal wants to attract all committed agents, she chooses to
offer such a second period wage for a certain parameter interval. As in the previous
subsection, the conditions on parameters can be found by substituting the second
period wage.10 After some rewriting, this yields:
nq
nq + 1
2
2
 V   V  nq 
2
2
:
When the principal is in this situation she may choose to offer an exit bonus in
order to also induce unmotivated agents with low outside opportunities to quit.
Naturally, the principal will offer it after the unmotivated agents with high outside
options have left already. It should then be set at:
b =
1 + nq
q
 
V   V   n2
2
Note that, again, this exit bonus may prompt some motivated agents to quit. As
before, the condition for some motivated agents to quit under this exit bonus would
be V   V > 2
2
, which can be the case only when nq > 1.
Second, in all cases treated so far, the principal could increase the exit bonus to
a level that prompts some, or even all, motivated agents to quit after Period 1. As
noted in the previous subsection, this would conflict with the assumption that the
10Note that the expression for the second period wage to be used is the same as in Equation (8),
the first case treated in the previous subsection.
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principal is in need of motivated agents for Period 2. If she were not interested in
employing all motivated agents in Period 2, but only those with low outside oppor-
tunities, she can offer a wage profile that circumvents the adverse selection problem
regarding agents’ motivation. It would consist of a first period wage as described by
Equation (6) and a second period wage that is sufficient to induce the motivated
agents to stay:
w2 = V   
2
2
When offering this second period wage, agents who find out they are not motivated
prefer to quit and no exit bonus is needed.
Third, the principal may wish to tolerate some uncommitted agents in the first
period. She will already attract uncommitted agents with low outside opportunities
by marginally increasing the first period wage. As a consequence, she could decrease
the second period wage while still making the committed agents apply. This, how-
ever, gives the adverse selection concerning agents’ motivation less bite, so the exit
bonus can also be decreased. This process could be continued until the exit bonus
reaches its natural downward boundary b = 0. Thus, when allowing for some uncom-
mitted agents to apply, she can alleviate the adverse selection problem concerning
agents’ motivation the same way the lower exit bonus would do by offering a simple
flat wage:
w1 = w2 = V   q
2 + nq
1 + nq
2
2
:
Note that at this wage profile, uncommitted agents with high outside opportunities
still prefer not to apply.
Last, the principal may wish to hire all agents at the start of the first period. The
principal can do so by offering a first period wage marginally above
w1 = V   q
22
2
:
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The following second period wage is then sufficient to retain all motivated agents:
w2 = V   
2
2
:
Note that this is less than what is paid in the first period. It is just sufficient to
keep the motivated agents with high outside opportunities from leaving the prin-
cipal. At the same time, it may convince all unmotivated agents to quit, namely
when V   V < 2
2
. The optimal scheme for the principal, which may include an
exit bonus, will eventually depend on these parameters, the costs associated with
employing uncommitted agents, and the relative mass of agents with high or low
outside opportunities.
4.5 Discussion
The key findings of our analysis are twofold. First, using an exit bonus is only op-
timal when the outside option dispersion is large and intrinsic motivation plays a
comparatively minor role. The intuition behind this finding is that keeping out un-
committed agents necessitates a steep wage profile, in which the wage difference is
driven by the dispersion in outside options. Returning to our motivating example of
Zappos, one could hypothesize that the supply of uncommitted labor is particularly
high in a vice industry-driven economy like Nevada’s (see e.g. The Economist 2010).
The adverse selection problem regarding agents’ motivation, on the other hand, only
becomes pertinent when said wage difference is large compared to the difference in
motivation. Zappos does not offer a salary increase right after training; however, it
has been growing rapidly over the last years and has thus been able to offer career
opportunities that may act in lieu of wage increases (cf. Lazear 1979, Witkin 2012,
and Geron 2009). The economics literature on intrinsic motivation typically does
not focus on low skilled, repetitive jobs like those of a customer service representa-
tive. Taylor (2008), however, suggests that Zappos has created a work environment
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in which motivation plays a role. This relates to its policy of avoiding performance
measurement with the tools common to this industry in favor of having motivated,
empowered employees (cf. Hsieh 2010). While Zappos reportedly creates a pleas-
ant work environment (see e.g. Fortune 2012 and Glassdoor 2013), the actual tasks
of working in customer service have been shown to be emotionally exhausting (cf.
Singh et al. 1994), giving rise to the notion that a motivated employee may enjoy
the job not much more than an unmotivated employee. As a consequence, even an
employee who finds out to be unmotivated may, in view of the career opportunities
at Zappos, prefer to remain in the firm. In line with the predictions of our model,
this would be a situation where an employer finds it profit increasing to offer an exit
bonus.
Second, we predict that the exit bonus needs to come as a surprise to the agents
in order to function well. The question of whether or not potential applicants do
anticipate that Zappos may offer an exit bonus is an empirical one. We do, how-
ever, have reason to believe the exit bonus has not been anticipated. While Zappos
does confirm the existence of the exit bonus publicly (see e.g. Hsieh 2010 and Zap-
pos 2013b), these sources are directed at interested outsiders rather than potential
future employees. Most importantly, there is no mention of the exit bonus in job
descriptions or on the recruitment website (see e.g. Zappos 2013a). Another indi-
cation that McFarland (2008)’s concern has not (yet) materialized is that the exit
bonus is only accepted by a one-digit percentage of new hires (see e.g. Hsieh 2010
and Zappos 2013b). If the exit bonus were anticipated by a large fraction of the local
labor force, one would expect this number to be higher, despite Zappos’ screening
efforts.
Furthermore, we have made some conjectures concerning the production func-
tion of the firm and concerning conditions in the labor market that lead to the emer-
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gence of an exit bonus. Zappos asserts to be interested in its employees remaining
in the firm for long periods (cf. Geron 2009), a fact that supports the notion that it
is costly to grant short-term employment, which is the reason why the principal in
our model chooses to deter uncommitted agents from applying. Our model shows
that a profit-maximizing principal in need of some new motivated agents may hire
agents with low outside opportunities and design a flat wage that will prompt agents
who find out that they are unmotivated to quit. If, however, the principal is in need
of many new motivated agents,11 the second period wage needed is ”too high”, such
that an exit bonus emerges. We believe a fast growing firm with a pronounced em-
phasis on customer service like Zappos fits this scenario very well.
5 Concluding Remarks
We have put forward a model that shows under which circumstances a firm may
find it optimal to use exit bonuses to convince intrinsically unmotivated employees
to quit. We show that such a situation may arise when a firm offers a steep wage
profile, in our example due to an adverse selection problem caused by potential job
applicants with a short horizon. In particular, this problem needs to be severe in
comparison to the expected motivational rents earned during an applicant’s career.
As a consequence, an exit bonus is more likely to be offered when potential appli-
cants do not expect to enjoy working in this particular job too much.
Alternative explanations as to why we observe the exit bonus appear to fail. For
example, the exit bonus may be used by an employer to signal that employees can
earn motivational rents when working for her, rather than as a means to solve the
adverse selection problem concerning agents’ motivation. However, in that case, we
11Note that the satisfaction of this need comes hand in hand with the necessity to tolerate some
unmotivated agents in the second period, unless nq < 1.
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would expect Zappos to advertise the exit bonus actively. The same is true when
exit bonuses are used to solve a commitment problem on the side of the employer.
For instance, an employer may be able to commit to creating a pleasant work envi-
ronment by offering an exit bonus. The first adverse selection problem that we iden-
tified may apply here too, making advertized exit bonuses not profit-maximizing.
Indeed, our analysis suggests that an exit bonus must not be advertised. As such,
the exit bonus may be considered an out of equilibrium phenomenon. If offering it
became a common HR practice, our model predicts that it would no longer have
the desired effect. One would have to expect an influx of uncommitted applicants
who are (only) interested in receiving the exit bonus after a short training period.
This would require increasing screening efforts by HR departments to filter out
such job candidates which - at least in some environments - may not be feasible or
prohibitively costly.
An analogy to the dynamics described above can be found in a rather delicate
area: Switzerland offers Tunisian asylum seekers money if they decide to return to
their country of origin (cf. NZZ 2012).12 Applications for asylum from Tunisian cit-
izens are rarely accepted in the Swiss Confederation and refugees are only eligible
for the “return assistance” before their application for asylum has been decided on.
It could be argued that the information structure in this example is comparable to
that in our model. Applicants have private information on their chances to receive
refugee status, and are willing to await the ruling in the relatively bad living condi-
tions of an asylum seeker (cf. Hatton 2004). If offered money upon return, some
applicants may decide to return, namely those who are relatively “unmotivated”, be-
12Note that Switzerland and other countries offer several forms of return assistance to refugees
and other migrants (see e.g. Swiss Confederation 2013, Rijksoverheid 2013, or UK Border Agency
2013). The Swiss program for Tunisian asylum seekers, however, exposes most parallels to our study.
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cause they deem their chances of being accepted as low. Just as in our setup, it is
crucial that this policy is not widely known. Otherwise, one could expect refugee
numbers to rise, or even non-immigrants starting to apply for asylum in the hope of
receiving a return assistance.
The motivation to develop the model presented in this paper originated in an
observation of one single firm. This could raise concerns about the relevance of
the HR policy we analyze. We can, however, conceive a few arguments to put the
singularity of this observation into perspective. While it is of course possible that
using an exit bonus is not profit maximizing, our model yields conditions under
which its use would be the optimal strategy. It may be that these conditions are
just not satisfied at other firms. Secondly, other firms may simply not be aware of
this innovation in compensation policies. This is supported by the attention that
Zappos’ conduct has received in the press. Finally, a key result of our analysis is that
the exit bonus needs to come as a surprise. In light of this, it may very well be that
firms use tools such as exit bonuses without outsiders knowing about it.
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Appendix
In Subsection 4.3 we have given an intuitive account as to why the exit bonus must
not be anticipated by the agents. Formally, the argument runs as follows. With an
anticipated exit bonus, the first period wage must fulfill the following condition in
order to still deter all uncommitted agents from applying:
w1  V   b  q
22
2
(16)
When the principal advertises the exit bonus, it becomes common knowledge that
it will always be set such that at least the unmotivated agents with high outside
opportunities leave after Period 1. As a result, the overall participation constraint
of the committed agents collapses to:
w1 +
q22
2
+ n

q

w2 +
2
2

+ (1  q)

V+
b
n

 (1 + n)V :
Combined with Equation (16), this gives us the following expression for the second
period wage:
w2  (1 + n)V
nq
  w1
nq
  1
nq
q22
2
  1  q
q

V +
b
n

  
2
2
) w2 = 1 + nq
nq
V   w1
nq
 
 q
n
+ 1
 2
2
  1  q
nq
b: (17)
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So, in comparison to the previously found expressions, the principal can indeed ex-
tract the expected value of exit bonus payments 1 q
nq
b in the second period wage.
Finally, the exit bonus needs to violate the continuation constraint of the commit-
ted unmotivated agents with high outside opportunities:
b  n  w2   V  :
Using Equation (17), it follows that:
b = n

1 + nq
nq
V   w1
nq
  q + n
n
2
2
  (1  q)
nq
b  V

() b = V   w1   q (q + n) 
2
2
:
Setting Condition (16) binding, we get an expression for w1 that we substitute:
b = V   V + b+ q
22
2
  q (q + n) 
2
2
() 0 = V   V   nq 
2
2
That is, the exit bonus cannot be set optimally anymore. An announced exit bonus
b and the first period wage w1 become perfect substitutes so that it is impossible to
solve both adverse selection problems at once.
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